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COMMENTS
THE EXCHANGE REQUIREMENT IN
MULTIPARTY AND NONSIMULTANEOUS
EXCHANGES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
AND STATUTORY SOLUTION
by Robert H Voelker
ECTION 1031(a) of the Internal Revenue Code I provides for non-
recognition of gain or loss on exchanges of like-kind property.2 This
section contains a multitude of traps for the unwary tax practitioner.
Because the narrow language of the statute is not easily applied to the
complexity of many modem transactions, the Internal Revenue Service
and the courts have reclassified some well-intentioned exchanges as sales
and repurchases, thereby defeating attempted nonrecognition under sec-
tion 1031. This Comment analyzes the provisions and potential pitfalls of
section 1031 in light of judicial decisions that have construed the statute
liberally. Such an analysis suggests that the courts have emasculated the
congressional intent underlying the nonrecognition provision. This Com-
ment therefore concludes that section 1031 should be amended to meet the
realities of modem transactions and to provide a greater degree of cer-
tainty for the tax practitioner structuring like-kind exchanges.
I. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Congress promulgated section 1031(a), as well as its predecessor, 3 to
provide deferral of taxation on simple barter transactions. 4 The legislative
1. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1976).
2. Section 103 1(a) provides: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for
productive use in trade or business or for investment. . . is exchanged solely for property of
a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment." Id.
The words "like kind" refer to the nature or character of property rather than to its grade or
quality. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1967). The requirement of an exchange for property
of like kind basically prohibits exchanges of real property for personal property and vice
versa. I S. GUERIN, TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE DISPOSITIONS § 11.01 (1982); see also I.
FAGGEN, D. BLOCKOWICS, J. SCHWIETERS, D. BRADFORD, J. BROWN, M. SCHWARZ, R. STE-
VENS & D. WATERS, FEDERAL TAXES AFFECTING REAL ESTATE § 8.01[3] (Rev. 5th ed.
1983) (general discussion of like-kind requirement).
3. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 112(b) (current version at I.R.C. § 1031(a)
(1976)).
4. See United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1962); Trenton Cotton Oil
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history to the nonrecognition provision indicates that one of Congress's
purposes in allowing tax-free exchanges was to eliminate the administra-
tive expense of valuing every "horse trade" transaction that occurred.-
Another apparent motive was protection of the revenues against wash sales
transactions, in which the taxpayer's economic status remains the same but
the taxpayer nevertheless claims a tax loss resulting from a sale of invest-
ment property and immediate repurchase of an identical investment. 6
Some courts have recognized that these factors motivated Congress in
passing section 1031(a), 7 but most decisions have expressly rejected them
as controlling.8
The primary legislative purpose for the nonrecognition statute is not
clear,9 and courts have attributed several different rationales to Congress.
Many courts have stated that the basic reason for the special treatment of
like-kind exchanges is that the taxpayer's economic situation after the ex-
change is fundamentally the same as it was before the exchange.' 0 This
rationale for nonrecognition is known as the "continuity of interest" or
"continuity of investment" doctrine." The continuity of interest theory
holds that a taxpayer should not be taxed on an exchange in which he has
not cashed in on his investment. Although the taxpayer may realize a gain
Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1945); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 554, 564; H.R. REP. No. 304, 67th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 168, 175.
5. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Godine v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1597 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 554, 564; Van Dom, Planning Tax-Free Like-Kind Exchanges
of Real Estate, in TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE TRANSFERS AND SALES 35, 42-43 (J. Halpern
ed. 1979); Duhl, Like-Kind Exchanges Under Section 1031. Multiparty Exchanges, Non-
simultaneous Exchanges and Exchanges of Partnership Interests, 58 TAXES 949, 950 (1980);
Levine, Simultaneity in Exchanges: Does Code Sec. 1031 Require Simultaneity of Ex-
change?-Starker 11 on Appeal, 58 TAXES 145, 149 (1980).
6. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 168,
176.
7. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) (valuation); Century
Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951) (wash sales); Godine v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1597 (1977) (valuation); Smith v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 704, 705 (1975) (wash sales).
8. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959); Coupe v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 408 (1969). The continuity of investment rationale is the domi-
nant motive that recent decisions have attributed to Congress. See infra notes 10-11 and
accompanying text.
9. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979) (legislative purpose is
"elusive").
10. E.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Carl-
ton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner,
269 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1959); Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th
Cir. 195 1); Godine v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1597 (1977); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 704, 705 (1975), aff'd, 537 F.2d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1976).
11. See Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653, 658 (1980); Koch v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 54, 63-64 (1978). The notion of continuity of investment pervades other nonrecognition
provisions of the Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 351 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (nonrecognition of
gain or loss on transfer of property to controlled corporation); id. § 354 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (nonrecognition of gain or loss on exchanges of stock in certain reorganizations); id.




or loss on the transfer, his overall economic status continues unchanged;
thus, like the requirement of a discernible realizing event prior to taxa-
tion,12 the continuity of interest theory disallows tax on a mere exchange.
This line of reasoning appears to explain in part Congress's rationale for
section 1031(a); it is not, however, entirely persuasive. A taxpayer's eco-
nomic position is similarly unaltered by a sale of property and reinvest-
ment of the proceeds,' 3 but such a transaction is expressly taxable.' 4
Congress therefore must have perceived factors in addition to continuity of
interest that set like-kind exchanges apart from other transactions.
Some courts have noted that the imposition of a tax on persons who roll
over investments into like-kind property would result in a liquidity prob-
lem for taxpayers who lack sufficient cash to pay the tax.' 5 Although this
factor is not mentioned in the legislative history to section 1031, the courts
reason that Congress, in its deliberations on the nonrecognition statutes,
must have been concerned about taxing illiquid taxpayers.16 This ration-
ale is limited, however, because a taxpayer who enters into a sale and re-
purchase transaction also does not experience any increase in liquidity, but
nevertheless is expressly subject to tax. 17 Cash flow considerations cannot,
therefore, be the sole motive behind the special tax treatment afforded to
exchanges.
Courts have also attributed valuation considerations to Congress as the
rationale underlying section 1031.18 Exchanges typically do not involve
valuation of the properties exchanged even though in reality both parties
assess the relative worth of the properties in determining the benefits of
entering into the exchange. The absence of an objective means of valua-
tion of the properties transferred would create costly administrative
problems if the exchange were taxed; nonrecognition is an efficient solu-
tion to the administrative difficulty. 19 Like the continuity of interest and
12. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (stock dividend does not involve
realization and therefore may not be taxed). See generally D. GAFFNEY, D. SKADDEN & J.
WHEELER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4-5 to -7 (1982) (defining realization
for tax purposes); W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, TEXT AND
READINGS 74-75 (1976) (quoting Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal In-
come Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1129-31 (1974)) (value of deferral in realization and
nonrecognition); C. MCCARTHY, B. MANN, B. ABBIN, W. GREGORY & J. LINDGREN, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, ITS SOURCES AND APPLICATIONS §§ 3.24-.27 (1968) (effect of reali-
zation doctrine on difference between capital and income).
13. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979).
14. I.R.C. § 1001 (1976).
15. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Levine, supra note 5,
at 149; see Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967).
16. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 704, 706 (1975); see Carlton v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 238, 241
(5th Cir. 1967).
17. I.R.C. § 1001 (1976); see Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir.
1979); Levine, supra note 5, at 149.
18. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Century Elec. Co. v.
Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951); Godine v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1595, 1597 (1977).
19. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 554,
563-65.
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illiquidity concepts, however, the notion of avoiding valuation does not
conclusively explain the enactment of section 103 1(a). Because the trans-
fer of even one dollar in addition to the like-kind properties forces a valua-
tion to determine the amount of gain or loss realized,20 avoidance of
valuation apparently was not of paramount concern to Congress. 21 In
sum, Congress's reasons for conferring nonrecognition upon like-kind ex-
changes remain a mystery.
II. THE EXCHANGE REQUIREMENT-THE STANDARDS
Despite the lack of a clear legislative purpose for section 1031, the courts
have recognized that a fundamental prerequisite to a valid section 1031
transaction is the occurrence of an exchange, rather than a cash sale and
reinvestment of the sale proceeds. 22 Ultimate receipt by the taxpayer of
like-kind property is not in itself sufficient. 23 The line of demarcation be-
tween an exchange and a sale and reinvestment, however, is not clear.24
The Treasury Department and the courts have traditionally defined an ex-
change as "a reciprocal transfer of property-'the act of giving or taking
20. LR.C. § 1001(b) (1976). The amount of gain realized must be determined for re-
porting purposes even though the increase in the value of the property may clearly cause the
entire amount of boot received to be recognized as gain on the transaction.
21. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352 (9th Cir. 1979); Levine, supra note 5,
at 149.
22. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967); Allen v. Commissioner,
43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1045, 1046 (1982); Meadows v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 611, 612
(1981); Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1489 (1981); Barker v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 555, 560-61 (1980); R. GOODMAN, REAL PROPERTY EXCHANGES §§ 2.17-
.19 (G. Graham ed. 1982); Duhl, supra note 5, at 953.
23. In Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134 (1980), the taxpayer desired to exchange
his farm for another in order to avoid capital gains tax. The prospective purchaser of the
taxpayer's property acquired an option on farmland suitable to the taxpayer. Due to unfore-
seen circumstances, however, the prospective purchaser could not complete the exchange
and instead transferred the option and cash to the taxpayer, who used the cash to exercise
the option and acquire the desired property. The Tax Court held that the fact the farms
were of like kind was not sufficient. It was necessary that there be an "exchange" of like-
kind property. Id. at 1139-40; see Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255, 257 (N.D. Ga.
1968); Gibson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 168, 170 (1982).
Three types of transactions occur, however, in which the Code permits a sale and reinvest-
ment to qualify for nonrecognition. These situations include the sale of a principal resi-
dence if it is replaced by another residence, I.R.C. § 1034 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); the sale of
low-income rental housing to a qualifying charitable organization or tenants' union if the
proceeds are reinvested within a certain time period, id. § 1039 (1976); and the reinvestment
of insurance proceeds from the involuntary conversion of property, id. § 1033 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981).
24. One commentator has recognized that "the shadowy distinction between a sale-
purchase and an exchange causes the tax result to turn on seemingly insignificant factors."
Van Dorn, supra note 5, at 44; see also Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 561 (1980)
(substance of sale-reinvestment transaction is "not much different" from substance of an
exchange); cf. Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180, 199 (1967) (quoting an exchange
price in agreement did not necessarily indicate sale). Compare Barker, 74 T.C. at 566 ("[t]he
conceptual distinction between an exchange qualifying for section 1031 on the one hand and
a sale and reinvestment on the other is largely one of form."); with Biggs v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 905, 914 (1978) ("well established principle that the substance of a transaction,
rather than the form in which it is cast, ordinarily determines its tax consequences"), aff'd,
632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
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one thing in return for another,' " and "mutual giving and receiving of
commodities without the intervention of money. ' 25 Early case law there-
fore envisioned an exchange as an event similar to the barter transaction
contemplated by Congress when it initially placed the nonrecognition pro-
vision into the Code in 1921.26
In Carlton v. United States27 the Fifth Circuit distinguished between a
sale and an exchange, stating that "[t]he very essence of an exchange is the
transfer of property between owners, while the mark of a sale is the receipt
of cash for the property. "28 Unfortunately this definition has provided lit-
tle guidance to the courts for determining the requisites of modern like-
kind exchanges, which frequently give the seller a great deal of control
over the sales proceeds. In applying the exchange requirement in various
factual contexts, the courts have developed two tests to ascertain whether
or not an exchange has occurred, the contractual interdependence doctrine
and the unitary plan approach. The contractual interdependence doctrine
focuses on the mutuality or reciprocity that the definition of an exchange
entails. 29 The key to this test is that the taxpayer/transferor and the pro-
spective purchaser of the taxpayer's property must each transfer his own
property in consideration for the property he receives. 30 The Service
phrases the test in terms of whether the sale and repurchase are "reciprocal
25. Estate of Grant v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 1233, 1245 (1937). The Treasury De-
partment requires that an exchange "be a reciprocal transfer of property." Rev. Rul. 77-297,
1977-2 C.B. 304, 305; see Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1967); Gibson
v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 168, 170 (1982); Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1490 (1981).
26. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Nonrecognition of gain or loss on the
exchange of like-kind property originated with section 202(c)(i) of the Revenue Act of 1921,
42 Stat. 227, 230. Section 202(c)(1) allowed nonrecognition even with respect to exchanges
of securities. Abuse of the nonrecognition provisions in security exchanges and the conse-
quent loss of revenue caused Congress to eliminate nonrecognition treatment for security
exchanges in 1924. Revenue Act of 1924, § 203, 43 Stat. 256-58; see Letter from Secretary of
the Treasury A.W. Mellon to William R. Green (Jan. 23, 1923), 1939-1 C.B. (Pt. 2) 845, 846.
This revision, embodied in article 1572(a) of regulation 65 (1924), was carried over into
§ 1031 (a). For a more detailed background of the legislative history of § 1031, see Banoff &
Fried, An Analysis of Recent IRS Attempt to Narrow the Scope of the Tax-Free Like-Kind
Exchange, 51 J. TAX'N 66, 68 (1979).
27. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
28. Id. at 242.
29. Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969). In Coupe the court stated: "Of crucial
importance in such an exchange is the requirement that title to the parcel transferred by the
taxpayer in fact be transferred in consideration for property received." Id. at 405; see
Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); Carlton, 385 F.2d at 241; Rut-
land v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40,47 (1977); R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, § 2.18.
30. In Carlton, General Development Corporation, the prospective purchaser of the
taxpayer's property, acquired an option on property that the taxpayer desired. Instead of
exercising the option and transferring the property to the taxpayer, General assigned the
option to him and paid him cash sufficient to exercise the option. The court held that the
transfers did not qualify for nonrecognition, basing its decision in part on the fact that Gen-
eral had never had title to property to offer as consideration for the taxpayer's property. 385
F.2d at 242-43. But cf Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that direct deeding of property to taxpayer, such that purchaser of taxpayer's property never




and mutually dependent transactions."' 3' Thus the focus is on the contrac-
tual relationship between the two transfers. Each transfer must be contrac-
tually conditional upon the occurrence of the other transfer.32 The
stringency of this test has frequently led the Service to attempt to defeat
nonrecognition by arguing that transactions lack contractual
interdependence. 33
The courts have used the contractual interdependence test infrequently,
however, and generally only in disallowing tax-free exchange status.34 In
Allen v. Commissioner,35 for example, the Tax Court denied nonrecogni-
tion to a taxpayer who had entered into successive transactions involving
placement of sale proceeds into escrow and subsequent use of the funds to
purchase other property from an outside party. Although the taxpayer ul-
timately obtained like-kind property, the court held that "[njothing in the
record indicates . . . that the successful completion of either transaction
was a condition of the other."' 36 The decision clearly indicates that ex-
change treatment would be allowed only when the individual steps in a
transaction are interdependent.
A literal application of the contractual interdependence test would effec-
tively limit the use of section 1031 to the barter form of exchange, because
only in such a simplified transaction does true contractual interdependence
exist. 37 Modem courts have recognized that exchanges often must involve
more than two parties and may consist of nonsimultaneous transfers. 38 In
formulating criteria sufficiently flexible to fit the varied forms of modern
exchanges, the courts have looked to the taxpayer's overall plan for the
31. Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395, 396.
32. The Service has defined "contractual interdependence" as requiring that (1) the pro-
spective recipient of the taxpayer's property (or his agent) must transfer to the taxpayer the
property to be received by him, and (2) title to the property received by the taxpayer must be
transferred in consideration for the property transferred by him. Brauer v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 1134, 1140 (1980).
33. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1968)
(exchange found); Carlton, 385 F.2d at 243 (sale found); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
555, 568 (1980) (exchange found); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978) (exchange
found), af'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. See Carlton, 385 F.2d at 243; Swaim v. United States, 79-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9462,
at 87,692; 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 80-578, at 80-1279 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 1979), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981); Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255,
259 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126, 136 (1965), aff'dper curiam, 377
F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1967).
35. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1045 (1982).
36. Id. at 1046.
37. The contractual interdependence test also poses practical problems for taxpayers
and practitioners. Many formalistic steps necessary to create mutually binding contractual
obligations are impractical from a business standpoint. For instance, direct deeding forces
the taxpayer to incur additional expenses and serves no useful purpose. See infra notes 62-
67 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1351 (9th Cir. 1979) (non-
simultaneous exchange qualifies for nonrecognition treatment); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 655-57 (5th Cir. 1968) (transactions occurring "at or about" same
time qualify as tax-free exchange); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 794 (9th Cir.
1963) (three-party exchange qualifies for nonrecognition).
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transfers. 39 The unitary plan approach requires that each transfer be "part
of an integrated plan intended to effectuate an exchange of like kind
properties. '40 The test focuses on whether the taxpayer receives like-kind
property as a result of mutually related transactions. 4' This approach em-
phasizes the substance of the relationship between a series of transactions
rather than the intricacies of contractual form.42
Because the focus of this approach is the taxpayer's overall plan, the
courts accord great weight to the taxpayer's subjective intent to effect an
exchange.4 3 As long as the taxpayer desired to exchange his property and
did not in the course of the transfers actually or constructively receive the
proceeds of the sale of his property, the courts have generally allowed non-
recognition.44 The unitary plan approach is, therefore, considerably more
favorable to the taxpayer than the contractual interdependence standard,
and courts analyzing modem multiparty and nonsimultaneous exchanges
have applied it liberally.45 In 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commissioner,46 for
39. In Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980),
the court stressed the substance of the transaction rather than its form. 69 T.C. at 914. The
Tax Court rejected the Service's argument that contractual interdependence between the
taxpayer's transfer of his property and his receipt of replacement property was a prerequisite
to a valid § 1031 exchange. ld. The decision focused on whether the two transfers "were
interdependent parts of an overall plan." 1d.; see Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 480 F.2d
710, 713-14 (4th Cir. 1973); Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691
(5th Cir. 1954); Milbrew, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1467, 1490 (1981); Barker
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 564 (1980).
40. Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 914-15 (1978).
41. See Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980); Kanawha Gas &
Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954); J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 618 (1962); Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395, 396.
42. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, § 2.19.
43. Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson
v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1963); Smith v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 704, 706-07 (1975); Woodbury v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 180, 198-99 (1967); J.H.
Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 615 (1962). Many courts, however,
dispute the importance of the taxpayer's intent to effect an exchange. See, e.g., Biggs v.
Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that intent "is not disposi-
tive" but emphasizing taxpayer's intent nevertheless); Hayden v. United States, 82-2
U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 9604, at 85,196 (D. Wyo. Nov. 13, 1981) ("The intent of the taxpayer to
qualify for § 1031 is irrelevant."); Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255, 257 (N.D. Ga.
1968) ("Jilt is legally irrelevant that the taxpayer-plaintiff intended so devise a transaction
which would bring him within the letter of the statute." (emphasis m original)); Barker v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 564 (1980) ("While intent alone is not sufficient ... it is rele-
vant to a determination of what transpired."); Godine v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
1595, 1598 (1977) ("What actually occurred must control, and not the mere motives or intent
of the parties.").
44. Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 480 F.2d 710, 713 (4th Cir. 1973); Barker v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 555, 564 (1980); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 409 (1969); Rev.
Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, 305.
45. In Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979), the court refused to apply
§ 1031 strictly pursuant to the language of Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1957). That regulation
provides that "[n]onrecognition is accorded by the Code only if the exchange is one which
satisfies both (1) the specific description in the Code of an excepted exchange, and (2) the
underlying purpose for which such exchange is excepted from the general rule." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1002-1(b) (1957). The court recognized that there has been a "long line of cases liberally
construing section 1031," indicating that the regulation had been rejected. 605 F.2d at 1352;
see infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
46. 65 T.C. 6 (1975).
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example, the prospective purchaser advanced funds to the taxpayer to en-
able the taxpayer to exercise its option on the property desired by the pro-
spective purchaser. The taxpayer then exchanged properties with the
prospective purchaser. The court construed the transaction liberally, hold-
ing that the taxpayer had not sold its option to the prospective purchaser
"but rather [had] a valid plan to exchange properties. '47 The taxpayer's
intent to execute an exchange is, therefore, of paramount importance
under the unitary plan approach.
III. THE STANDARDS APPLIED: TRAPS FOR THE UNWARY
Although the contractual interdependence and unitary plan approaches
appear uncomplicated, application of these concepts to modern exchanges
involves many practical and theoretical problems. The difficulty in most
cases of locating a transferee who desires to acquire the taxpayer's prop-
erty and who also possesses property appealing to the taxpayer has gener-
ally limited barter as a realistic form of transaction. 48  Consequently,
modern property owners designed multiparty and nonsimultaneous ex-
changes to remedy this difficulty, and these forms now constitute the norm
in exchange transactions. 49
A. Multiparty Exchanges
A multiparty exchange involves three or more parties in a complex web
of transfers.50 For example, a so-called "four-corner exchange" includes
the taxpayer/transferor, a prospective purchaser of the taxpayer's prop-
erty, a prospective seller of the replacement property, and an escrow agent.
In a simultaneous four-corner transaction the escrow agent receives the
cash purchase price from the prospective purchaser of the taxpayer's prop-
erty. He then pays the money over to the prospective seller of the replace-
ment property, receives the taxpayer's title in exchange for title to the
replacement property, and transfers title to the taxpayer's old property to
the prospective purchaser.5' Although the series of transfers may not in-
47. Id. at 15.
48. See Campbell, Real Estate Investment Planning Enhanced By the Code's Tax-Free
Exchange Provisions, 19 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 20, 20-21 (1977); Taxfree Exchanges Under Sec-
tion 1031, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 61-4th, at A-15 (1982).
49. See Duhl, supra note 5, at 951.
50. See, e.g., Hayden v. United States, 82-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9604, at 85,197 (D. Wyo.
Nov. 13, 1981); Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653, 660 (1980); Biggs v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 905, 913 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Godine v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1598 (1977); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 405 (1969); Mercan-
tile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82, 86 (1935). A round-robin exchange involving
three parties and three separate properties received IRS approval in Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-
i C.B. 247, 248. Exchanges involving as many as 23 separate properties have been reported.
See Duhl, supra note 5, at 951 n.13; Chi. Tribune, Aug. 17, 1980, § 14, at 2.
51. See generally R. GOODMAN, supra note 17, § 2.25 (pointing out factors of agency
relationship); Duhl, supra note 5, at 951-54 (describing satisfactory multiparty exchanges).
In Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), for exam-
ple, the taxpayer's attorney acted as "agent for [the] syndicate" in purchasing the replace-
ment property from an outside party with funds provided by the purchaser of the taxpayer's
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terrelate contractually and would therefore fail the contractual interdepen-
dence test, the overall scheme is an exchange of like-kind properties that
should normally qualify for tax-free exchange treatment under the unitary
plan approach.5 2
The transfers in a multiparty exchange may nevertheless be disqualified
from nonrecognition if the escrow agent is deemed to be the taxpayer's
agent.5 3 In such a case the escrow party's actual or constructive receipt of
cash is imputed to the taxpayer.5 4 The courts have gone to great lengths,
however, to avoid disqualification of tax-free exchanges because of actual
or constructive receipt by the escrow agent.5 5 In Coupe v. Commissioner56
the taxpayer desired to enter into a like-kind exchange, but could not reach
an agreement with the transferee. The taxpayer and his attorney therefore
devised a scheme by which the attorney received the proceeds from the
transferee, purchased the desired property, and exchanged it for the tax-
payer's property. The court held that the taxpayer's attorney, by receiving
the sales proceeds and purchasing the replacement property, acted as agent
for the transferee but not as agent for the taxpayer-transferor. 57 This ques-
tionable factual finding resulted in avoidance of constructive receipt of the
sales proceeds by the taxpayer so that section 1031 applied to the
transaction.
Other courts have held that a corporation controlled by the taxpayer's
attorney and his family s and even a corporation controlled by the tax-
payer 59 are not agents of the taxpayer. Generally, escrow and real estate
agents are not deemed to be agents of the transferor if they are subject to
some risk of loss and have some opportunity to profit from the transac-
tion.60 In the case most favorable to the taxpayer the prospective pur-
property. 69 T.C. at 908. The attorney then exchanged this property for the taxpayer's
property, which was then deeded to the purchaser. The transaction thus involved four par-
ties: the taxpayer, the purchaser of the taxpayer's property, the taxpayer's attorney, and the
seller of the property that the taxpayer desired.
52. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
53. See W.D. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1948); Mays v.
Campbell, 246 F. Supp. 375, 377 (N.D. Tex. 1965); Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 40, 48 (1977); J. H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 616 (1962);
Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, 305; Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225, 225; Van Dorn,
supra note 3, at 49-5 1; Taxfree Exchanges Under Section 1031, supra note 48, at A-16.
54. As early as 1935 the Service in Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82
(1935), argued that a title company acted as the transferor's agent in receiving cash from the
transferee and purchasing replacement property. The Board of Tax Appeals rejected this
theory because the purchase agreement was enforceable against the company as a principal.
Id. at 85; see R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, § 2.25; Taxfree Exchanges Under Section 1031,
supra note 48, at A-16. The doctrine of constructive receipt is codified in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.451-2 (1982).
55. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, § 2.25; Van Dorn, supra note 5, at 45-50.
56. 52 T.C. 394 (1969).
57. Id. at 406.
58. Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1178 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. Mays v. Campbell, 246 F. Supp. 375, 377 (N.D. Tex. 1965); Rutland v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40, 47 (1977).
60. See J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 616-17 (1962); Rev.
Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, 305; Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 332, 333. In J. H Baird
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner a realty company purchased land desired by the taxpayer as
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chaser would engage an escrow or real estate agent to purchase the
replacement property and transfer it to the taxpayer in exchange for his
property. The prospective purchaser may, however, be unwilling to enter
into such an arrangement. 61 As in Coupe, the taxpayer himself must then
engage someone to handle the exchange and risk a finding of agency or
constructive receipt, either of which would defeat nonrecognition
treatment.
Direct deeding of the replacement property from the prospective seller
to the taxpayer-transferor is a second factor that creates conceptual diffi-
culties for the courts.62 The parties may choose direct deeding to avoid
local transfer taxes and other costs, eliminating the prospective purchaser
and the escrow agent from the transfer altogether. The problem with a
direct transfer is that the taxpayer-transferor does not receive like-kind
property from the party to whom he transferred his own property.63 No
exchange of property with the prospective purchaser of the taxpayer's
property occurs, because the prospective purchaser does not transfer any
property to the taxpayer.64 A court applying the contractual interdepen-
dence test would deny nonrecognition treatment in a case of direct deeding
because the taxpayer does not receive property in consideration for the
property he transfers.65 Recent cases, however, have accepted direct deed-
ing as a practical necessity, looking beyond legal form to the substance of
the transaction in determining whether an exchange actually occurred. 66
Nevertheless, the issue of direct deeding is not entirely moot, because
courts applying the unitary plan approach to the exchange requirement
a replacement building site and constructed a building thereon to the taxpayer's specifica-
tions. The court found that the realty company carried out these activities on its own behalf
and not as an agent for the taxpayer. 39 T.C. at 617. The court noted that under the terms
of the agreement with the taxpayer the realty company bore some of the taxes and fees with
respect to the replacement property during the construction period and that such burdens of
ownership belied the status of mere agent. Id.
61. See Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1963); Coupe v. Com-
missioner, 52 T.C. 394, 406 (1969); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82, 85
(1935).
62. The IRS has frequently attacked exchanges that do not employ pass-through deeds,
in which the purchaser of the taxpayer's property temporarily holds title to the replacement
property. See, e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1967); Alderson
v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1963); W.D. Haden Co. v. Commissioner,
165 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1948); Meadows v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 611, 612
(1981); Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134, 1140, 1144-45 (1980); Biggs v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 905, 914-15 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-1
C.B. 247.
63. Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 126, 135-36 (1965).
64. Meadows v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 611, 612 (1981).
65. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967), is a prime example of the
contractual interdependence test's requirement of a pass-through deed. See supra note 30.
66. The Fifth Circuit has recently unequivocally allowed direct deeding of the exchange
property. Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1175-77 (5th Cir. 1980). The Biggs deci-
sion apparently overrules the Fifth Circuit's holding in Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d
238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1967), that direct deeding disqualifies an exchange, although the Carl-
ton decision turned in part on the taxpayer's receipt of cash. The Tax Court has consistently
permitted direct deeding. See, e.g., Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 566-67 (1980);
Brauer v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1134, 1146 (1980).
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consider the pattern of deed transfers as indicative of the taxpayer's overall
plan.67
A third potential pitfall of section 1031 concerns the means of selecting
exchange property. In multiparty exchanges the taxpayer often actively
looks for and negotiates the purchase of replacement property because the
buyer of the taxpayer's property is unwilling or unable to take on such
responsibility.68 As the taxpayer's participation in the acquisition process
increases, the transaction increasingly resembles a sale and repurchase
rather than an exchange, particularly if cash enters the transaction via an
escrow account or other security arrangement. 69 In Alderson v. Commis-
sioner70 the court held that the transferee must actually purchase the ex-
change property, although the taxpayer may engage in extensive
negotiations for its purchase. 71 Evidently the sole restriction is that the
taxpayer may not actually sign the purchase and sale agreement on the
replacement property. 72 Form rather than substance is thus of paramount
importance in this aspect of the exchange transaction.
Another conceptual difficulty associated with multiparty exchanges con-
cerns the taxpayer's option to receive cash should the exchange agreement
fail. Courts have generally held that the option to receive cash in lieu of
like-kind property should the exchange agreement fall through does not
invalidate the tax-free status of the exchange if an exchange in fact took
place and the taxpayer intended from the beginning to receive like-kind
property.73 The courts have thus properly exalted substance over form in
this regard, looking to what actually happened rather than to the terms of
67. See, e.g., Meadows v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 611, 612 (1981) (although
transaction clearly involved sale and exchange, court focused on pattern of deed transfers).
68. See Biggs v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 1171, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1980); Coastal Termi-
nals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333, 334-35 (4th Cir. 1963); W.D. Haden Co. v. Com-
missioner, 165 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1948); Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
40, 46 (1977); Borchard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1643, 1647-48 (1965); Rev. Rul.
75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 333; G. ROBINSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE,
TEXT, FORMS AND TAX PLANNING IDEAS 12.04[21[a] (3d ed. 1979); Campbell, supra note
48, at 22-24.
69. The courts have, however, allowed taxpayers wide latitude in locating and financing
the purchase of the replacement property. In Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
40 (1977), the taxpayer handled all negotiations with respect to acquiring replacement prop-
erty, including "the purchase price, the terms of the transaction, the manner in which title
was to be conveyed and when the transaction was to be closed." Id. at 46. The court al-
lowed tax-free exchange treatment, noting that the taxpayer did not actually purchase the
exchange property but left this final step to the purchaser of his property. Id. at 47.
70. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
71. Id. at 795; see Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40, 46 (1977); Mercan-
tile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82, 86 (1935).
72. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1967); Alderson, 317
F.2d at 795; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82, 85 (1935).
73. Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 405 (1969). The court stated:
It is now well settled that when a taxpayer who is holding property for pro-
ductive use in a trade or business enters into an agreement to sell the property
for cash, but before there is substantial implementation of the transaction, ar-
ranges to exchange the property for other property of like kind, he receives the
nonrecognition benefits of section 103 1.
1d; Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1354 (9th Cir. 1979); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v.
United States, 320 F.2d 333, 335 (4th Cir. 1963); Alderson, 317 F.2d at 792.
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the exchange contract to determine the tax consequences of the
transaction. 74
The final problem area in multiparty exchanges is the relatively short
time during which the prospective purchaser of the taxpayer's property
holds title to the like-kind exchange property. Whether the prospective
purchaser is the ultimate purchaser or merely an escrow agent purchasing
for another buyer, such party normally holds title to the property the tax-
payer desires only momentarily because he usually purchases the like-kind
property for the sole purpose of exchanging it with the taxpayer. Although
the prospective purchaser does not assume the burdens and benefits of
owning the replacement property, the courts generally have permitted non-
recognition on exchange transactions despite such temporary ownership. 75
The courts' deference in this area thus takes into account the purchaser's
business-related need for temporary ownership of the replacement
property.
The courts, therefore, have applied the exchange requirement liberally
in cases involving multiparty transactions. 76 Use of the intent-focused uni-
tary plan approach has substantially mitigated the harshness of the con-
tractual interdependence test. Nonetheless, the conceptual difficulties of
multiparty exchanges remain for the courts and tax practitioners. The fur-
ther an exchange strays from the traditional barter model the greater the
likelihood that a court will reclassify it as a sale and reinvestment transac-
tion.77 Thus the practitioner structuring a multiparty transaction should
be aware of the doctrine of constructive receipt, particularly as it interacts
with the concept of agency. If the parties employ an escrow account they
should consider placing substantial restrictions on the taxpayer's access to
74. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82, 86-87 (1935). The IRS has
acquiesced in this approach. Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304, 305.
75. In Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963), the court held that the
prospective purchaser "need not assume the benefits and burdens of ownership in property
before exchanging it but may properly acquire title solelyfor thepurpose of exchange .. "
Id. at 795 (emphasis in original); see Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333,
336 (4th Cir. 1963); Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 562 (1980); Rutland v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 40, 48 (1977); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82,
83 (1935). Where the prospective purchaser acquires title to the replacement property for
the purpose of exchange, the exchange qualifies for nonrecognition as to the taxpayer, but
any gain or loss to the prospective purchaser is recognized. Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B.
333. The reason for this seemingly inconsistent treatment is that the prospective purchaser
has not held the exchanged property "in trade or business or for investment" as required by
§ 1031. Id.
76. The Tax Court demonstrated the liberal nature of the result-oriented unitary plan
test in Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905, 914-15 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1980). The court stated that it had found in Coupe "that the statute requires only that, as the
end result of an agreement, property is received as consideration for property transferred by
the taxpayer." 69 T.C. at 916 (citing Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394, 409 (1969)).
77. In Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555 (1980), the court warned taxpayers and
practitioners that "[n]otwithstanding those deviations from the standard multiple-party ex-
changes which have received judicial approval, at some point the confluence of some suffi-
cient number of deviations will bring about a taxable result. . . . [Tiaxpayers who stray too




the sales proceeds in the account.78 Additionally, the exchange should
provide for a pass-through deed, whereby the purchaser of the taxpayer's
property temporarily holds title to the replacement property, in order to
avoid a claim by the Service that the exchange failed because of direct
deeding. Finally, although the courts have allowed the taxpayer wide lati-
tude in negotiating for the purchase of exchange property, the taxpayer
should not enter into a sale and purchase contract with the prospective
seller, but rather should leave this final step to the prospective purchaser.
B. Nonsimultaneous Exchanges
The nonsimultaneous exchange, a relative newcomer among section
1031 exchanges,79 also contains procedural elements that may prevent
nonrecognition. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Starker v. United
States80 formally discussed the nonsimultaneous exchange for the first
time. In Starker the taxpayer transferred a large block of property to
Crown Zellerbach in return for the corporation's promise, evidenced by a
bookkeeping entry, to purchase replacement property designated by the
taxpayer within five years of the transfer. If the taxpayer failed to desig-
nate a sufficient amount of property within the five-year period, Crown
Zellerbach was to pay the balance of the account in cash at the end of that
period.
The Starker court discussed in detail the conceptual difficulties inherent
in the nonsimultaneous exchange. The court noted two aspects of non-
simultaneous exchanges that might cause disallowance of preferred tax
status.8 1 First, the court examined the possibility that the taxpayer might
receive cash sometime in the future. The court recognized that it had con-
sidered this question previously in the multiparty exchange cases.8 2 The
court found, as a matter of well-settled law, that the possibility of receiving
cash in the future did not prevent section 1031 from applying, as long as
the taxpayer intended from the outset to receive only like-kind property
and in fact did not receive cash during the course of the transaction.8 3
78. See Barker v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 555, 567-68 (1980); Brauer v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 1134, 1137-38 (1980); see Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304.
79. One commentator declares that "[u]ntil Starker, there was no express authority for
the proposition that Section 1031 . . .could involve nonsimultaneous transfers of property."
Welch, New Case Permits Long Delay in Completing Nontaxable Exchanges of Like-Kind
Property, 24 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 74, 74 (1980) (footnote omitted). Nonsimultaneity of ex-
change tacitly existed, however, in many qualified exchanges prior to the decision in Starker
v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson,
399 F.2d 652, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1968); Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir.
1967); Godine v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1595, 1597-98 (1977); Woodbury v. Com-
missioner, 49 T.C. 180, 198-99 (1967); J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.
608, 618 (1962); Home v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250, 255 (1945).
80. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 1353.
82. Id. at 1353-54; see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
83. 602 F.2d at 1354. The court stated unequivocally that "the mere possibility at the
time of agreement that a cash sale might occur does not prevent the application of section
1031." Id; cf. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1967), concerning a
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The Starker court also considered whether the nonsimultaneous nature
of the transaction should disqualify the exchange.84 The government ar-
gued that section 1.1002-1 (b) of the Treasury Regulations required simul-
taneity;8 5 that regulation provides that all exceptions to the general rule of
recognition of gain or loss on the disposition of property are to be con-
strued narrowly.8 6 After reviewing past litigation concerning section 1031,
however, the court found that other courts had construed the statute liber-
ally in favor of nonrecognition.8 7 The court therefore expressed doubt as
to whether the regulation had any continuing application to tax-free
exchanges. 88
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlin-
son 89 had previously recognized that nonsimultaneity of exchange did not
convert an exchange into a sale.90 In Redwing the taxpayer claimed that a
sale of used trucks to a dealer, followed several days later by a purchase of
new trucks from the same dealer, constituted a sale and repurchase such
that a loss on the sale should have been recognized. The court disagreed,
holding that the two transactions were contractually interdependent and,
therefore, merely steps in an exchange of like-kind properties. 9' Thus the
court required exchange treatment even though the transfers were not
simultaneous. 92
Although the Starker court did not specifically discuss the method of
securing a buyer's obligation to transfer property to the taxpayer in the
future, the means employed may cause constructive receipt of cash by the
taxpayer, thus disqualifying the exchange. 93 In Starker constructive re-
nonsimultaneous exchange involving an option to receive cash. The court in Carlton denied
exchange treatment because the taxpayer actually received cash. 385 F.2d at 241-43.
84. 602 F.2d at 1354-55.
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1957).
86. Id. ;see supra note 45.
87. 602 F.2d at 1352-53. The court cited Biggs v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 905 (1978),
aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), on this point. In Biggs the Tax Court reviewed various
activities in which taxpayers had engaged without causing disallowances of tax-free ex-
change treatment. For example, the taxpayer may locate the target property and negotiate
for its purchase. 69 T.C. at 913; see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. Additionally,
the taxpayer may supervise improvements to the target property and deposit earnest money
on such property. 69 T.C. at 913-14 (citing 124 Front Street, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
6, 15-18 (1975); J.H. Baird Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 608, 611 (1962)).
88. 602 F.2d at 1352.
89. 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
90. Id. at 658-59.
91. Id. at 659. The court found that "[tihe buying and selling were synchronous parts
meshed into the same transaction and not independent transactions." Id. at 656. The Serv-
ice had previously ruled against another taxpayer on this issue under identical facts. Rev.
Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 C.B. 395, 397.
92. 399 F.2d at 659; see also Home v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250, 254-56 (1945) (disal-
lowing loss deduction on sale of membership certificate on future exchange where taxpayer
had purchased another certificate eight days earlier); cf. I.R.C. § 1091 (1976) (disallowance
of losses from wash sales of stocks or securities); I.R.C. § 1092 (Supp. V 1981) (disallowance
of most losses arising from tax straddles).
93. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, §§ 5.4-.8; Berney, How to Protect the Owner Wait-
ing for Property in a Nonsimultaneous Exchange, 25 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 344, 345 (1981);
Welch, supra note 79, at 77.
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ceipt was not an issue because Crown Zellerbach's obligation to the tax-
payer was unsecured.94 In the normal nonsimultaneous exchange,
however, the taxpayer usually desires some security for the buyer's obliga-
tion. One option is to retain a security interest in the property transferred.
Merely holding such an interest in like-kind property does not cause con-
structive receipt because the holding of the interest does not entail a poten-
tial for receiving cash.95 Such an arrangement may not, however, be
acceptable to the buyer, who may wish to mortgage or sell the property. 96
The parties may therefore arrange for the taxpayer to hold a security inter-
est in other real property belonging to the buyer. 97 This form of security is
disadvantageous to the taxpayer, whose security interest is then
subordinate to the interests of prior secured creditors with respect to the
same property. 98 An additional problem raised by use of the buyer's other
property to secure the buyer's obligation is that the buyer may not own
sufficient other real estate to serve as collateral. Parties to nonsimultane-
ous exchanges may therefore seek other means of securing the contract.
Escrow and trust arrangements and joint bank accounts are alternative
forms of security, but they contain possible grounds for challenge by the
Service because of their potential for causing cash receipt by the taxpayer.
In one Revenue Ruling an escrow arrangement escaped imposition of the
constructive receipt doctrine because it contained substantial restrictions
on distribution of the proceeds to the taxpayer.99 The Service originally
allowed, in a Private Letter Ruling, an arrangement in which the proceeds
from the sale of the taxpayer's property were placed in trust for the tax-
payer's benefit pending acquisition of the replacement property.' °0 The
Service subsequently suspended' 0 and then revoked 0 2 its ruling allowing
such an arrangement, however, after the government's defeat in Starker.
Joint bank accounts in the names of taxpayer and purchaser are likely to
receive particular scrutiny by the Service because of their similarity to the
94. 602 F.2d at 1343.
95. In Starker the government had argued that the contract right to receive property in
the future was "not 'like' title to property, because it was like cash," so that § 1031 should
not apply. Id. at 1355. The court held, however, that "title to land is no more or less
equivalent to cash than a contract right to buy land." 1d. Likewise, a security interest in the
property transferred should not be treated as a cash equivalent because it represents only a
contract between the parties to transfer the property in the event of default. See Roach v.
Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 919, 924-25 (1930) (doctrine of constructive receipt to be applied
sparingly).
96. R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, § 5.6.
97. A charge by the Service of constructive receipt on this type of security arrangement
should fail for the same reasons as the attack on the taxpayer retaining a security interest on
his own property.
98. Cf TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(e)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1982-
1983) (priority between conflicting security interests in same collateral personal property
determined by time of filing or perfection of security interest).
99. Rev. Rul. 77-297, 1977-2 C.B. 304. The Regulations provide that "income is not
constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substantial limita-
tions or restrictions." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1964); see T.D. 6723, 1964-1 C.B. 73, 74.
100. Ltr. Rul. 7938087 (June 22, 1979).
101. Ltr. Rul. 8005049 (Nov. 8, 1979).
102. Ltr. Rul. 8046122 (Aug. 25, 1980).
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receipt of cash. A requirement that both taxpayer and purchaser sign for
withdrawals from such an account may overcome the constructive receipt
issue,' 03 but the Service has not declared its position in this area.
The nonsimultaneous exchange therefore poses conceptual difficulties
for the courts and practical difficulties for the taxpayer, particularly in re-
gard to securing the buyer's obligation. The court in Starker nevertheless
had little difficulty in determining that the potential receipt of cash by the
taxpayer should the agreement to exchange fail did not disqualify the ex-
change.1°4 In almost summary fashion the Starker court also dismissed
the government's argument that the nonsimultaneous nature of the trans-
action disqualified the exchange. 05 This decision is consistent with the
current judicial attitude allowing great flexibility in structuring section
1031 exchanges. 1°6 Under the unitary plan approach transfers such as the
Starker exchange merit nonrecognition because their ultimate result, an
exchange, is what the taxpayer intended from the start despite the complex
means used to reach it.107 The Starker court noted that nonsimultaneous
exchanges pose grave administrative difficulties for the courts and the
Service, 10 8 but declined to confront these issues, leaving that task instead
to Congress and the Service. 109 It is clear, therefore, that the non-
simultaneous exchange will continue to be susceptible to government chal-
lenges on the ground that it transgresses the permissible bounds of a true
exchange, causing constructive or actual receipt of cash that may not es-
cape recognition. 110
IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
Attempts by the courts to explain Congress's intent in passing section
1031, while revealing general opposition to the taxing of events that do not
involve recognized accessions to wealth,' 1 ' have failed to define satisfacto-
103. See R. GOODMAN, supra note 22, § 5.8.
104. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 87.
107. Starker, 602 F.2d at 1354.
108. Id. at 1356. The court did not specify the administrative problems that non-
simultaneous exchanges might cause.
109. Id. The court stated:
Some administrative difficulties may surface . . . . Our role, however, is not
necessarily to facilitate administration. It is to divine the meaning of the stat-
ute in a manner as consistent as possible with the intent of Congress and the
prior holdings of the courts. If our holding today adds a degree of uncertainty
to this area, Congress can clarify its meaning.
Id.
110. See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 651 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981). In Swaim the court
found that the taxpayers had actually received cash and cash equivalents, so that the return
of the consideration to the buyer several months later failed to achieve a tax-free exchange.
Id. at 1071.
I l1. See United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1960) (strike benefits held gift,
not taxable income); see also Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 83 (1977) (accession to
wealth occurred); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961) (accession to wealth if
actual command over property and no recognition of obligation to repay); Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (accession to wealth doctrine enunciated).
[Vol. 37
COMMENTS
rily the specific reasons for the statute's discrimination between exchanges
and sale and reinvestment transactions. The taxpayer's basic economic po-
sition does not change in either case. Clearly, however, Congress meant
section 1031 to apply only when the taxpayer continues in the same gen-
eral business or investment by means of an exchange." 2 As long as the
taxpayer's fortune remains tied to like-kind property, the exchange should
not be taxed, 13 but once the investment is converted, even temporarily,
into cash or property other than like-kind property the transaction loses its
exchange character and should be taxed. The Starker court disregarded
this principle. In summarily disposing of the issue of nonsimultaneity, the
court failed to note that the proceeds from the sale of the taxpayer's prop-
erty were no longer invested in like-kind property. Instead, the taxpayer's
investment had become a fixed money amount and no longer depended on
the economics of the real estate market.1 4 The transaction in Starker thus
differed from an actual exchange and fell outside the scope of Congress's
presumed reasons for granting nonrecognition to exchanges.
The courts' tolerance of multiparty exchanges also indicates that they
will go to great lengths to find that an exchange has occurred and that the
party handling the cash proceeds is not the taxpayer's agent. As noted,
even corporations controlled by the taxpayer or the taxpayer's attorney or
family have been declared not to be acting as the taxpayer's agent in re-
ceiving the proceeds from the sale of the taxpayer's property and locating
replacement property. 1 5 Courts applying the law of agency in other con-
texts would probably reach different conclusions." 16 The Tax Court has
also gone far afield in the area of constructive receipt, holding that an ad-
vance of cash by the prospective purchaser to the taxpayer to allow him to
exercise an option on the property desired by the prospective purchaser
does not constitute boot to the taxpayer in measuring gain or loss recog-
nized from the transaction and does not, therefore, disqualify the transac-
tion from nonrecognition treatment." 7 The reasoning behind such a
112. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
113. This notion is the crux of the continuity of interest rationale underlying section
1031. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
114. In Starker Crown Zellerbach transformed the taxpayer's investment into "exchange
value credits" on the corporate books. A "growth factor" accrued on the account during the
delay between the taxpayer's transfer of his property to Crown and Crown's transfer of
property to the taxpayer. The court held that the "growth factor" constituted disguised in-
terest. 602 F.2d at 1356. This conclusion is somewhat at odds with the court's holding that
an exchange occurred, because interest is defined as "compensation for the use or
forebearance of money," thus indicating a fixed monetary claim and not a volatile invest-
ment in real estate. Id ; see Duhl, supra note 5, at 961.
115. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
116. Many courts have held that the test for determining the existence of an implied
agency is the right of the principal to control the conduct of the agent, or the actual exercise
of such control. Nidiffer v. Clinchlield R.R., 600 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980);
True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Mach., Inc., 577 P.2d 991, 999 (Wyo. 1978). This test indicates
that the corporation controlled by the taxpayer in Rutland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 40 (1977), and the corporation controlled by the taxpayer's attorney in Biggs v. Com-
missioner, 632 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), should have been held to be agents of the respec-
tive taxpayers.
117. 124 Front St., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6, 16 (1975).
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determination is unclear.
In addition to the judicial manipulation of the exchange concept, section
1031 suffers from old age. The drafters of the statute envisioned two-party
barter transactions and devised a nonrecognition provision to fit that kind
of transaction." 18 Section 1031 does not accommodate the types of ex-
changes that are a common part of modem business transactions. The out-
moded nature of the provision may justify overreaching by the courts to
allow nonrecognition where both theory and practicality compel such
treatment. The certainty and clarity needed by practitioners and taxpayers
is lacking, however, when courts must update statutes on an ad hoc basis.
The maladies of section 1031 could be easily cured by eliminating its
main defect, the exchange requirement itself. The nature and definition of
an exchange have never been clear. Congress has avoided the exchange
requirement in other nonrecognition statutes that require continuity of in-
vestment. For example, the section 1033 limitation on the time allowed for
reinvestment of insurance proceeds from involuntary conversions includes
no such requirement;' 19 neither does the section 1034 time limit for rein-
vestment of the proceeds from the sale of a principal residence. 20 As a
result, a taxpayer may rely on these provisions without concerning himself
about such issues as constructive receipt, direct deeding, agency, momen-
tary deed possession, and nonsimultaneity; he need only reinvest the pro-
ceeds within the appropriate time frame. The tax practitioner, therefore,
may plan continuity of investment transactions under these provisions
with greater certainty of achieving nonrecognition than under section
1031.
Nonrecognition provisions without an exchange requirement avoid
other issues inherent in section 1031. For example, the Starker court did
not limit the length of time a taxpayer may take to decide whether to re-
ceive cash or like-kind property without causing recognition. Can such a
period extend indefinitely? If so, how is the statute of limitation' 2' affected
by a transfer of non-like-kind property more than three years after the
execution of the exchange agreement? May promises to transfer like-kind
property be pledged or sold, so that the taxpayer should be taxed on the
constructive receipt of cash? 122 At present, these administrative questions
have no answers, but conflicts in these areas are inevitable under the cur-
rent statutory language. These conflicts can be avoided only if Congress
accepts the Ninth Circuit's challenge in Starker and resolves the ambigui-
118. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
119. Section 1033 provides that if property is compulsorily or involuntarily converted
into money, gain or loss will not be recognized if the taxpayer reinvests these funds into
similar property or a controlling interest in a corporation owning similar property within
two years after disposition of the converted property. I.R.C. § 1033 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
120. Section 1034 provides that no gain will be recognized on the sale of a principal
residence if the proceeds from the sale are reinvested in a new principal residence within two
years from the date of sale. Id § 1034 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
121. Id § 6501 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
122. For a more detailed examination of the practical administrative problems that the
Starker decision presents, see Duhl, supra note 5, at 962-63.
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ties in section 1031.123
Alignment of section 1031 with other nonrecognition provisions that do
not currently require an exchange would also modernize section 1031 to
account for modem-day transactions. Requiring the taxpayer to execute a
pass-through deed, for example, is a costly and cumbersome step that
would be unnecessary in a multiparty exchange absent a formal exchange
requirement. 24 Similarly, the purchaser of the taxpayer's property would
not have to assist the taxpayer in the ritual of signing a purchase contract
with the prospective seller of the replacement property and then transfer-
ring the property to the taxpayer. By requiring such formalistic steps, sec-
tion 1031 exalts form over substance, a practice that the tax law should
avoid. 25
The advent of the unitary plan approach 26 to evaluating exchange
transactions, with its emphasis on the form of the transaction rather than
the substance, was a step in the right direction. That approach did not,
however, remove all of the hidden dangers of section 1031. Until Congress
steps in and revises section 1031, taxpayers and practitioners alike will fre-
quently remain unsure that the transactions they have structured will qual-
ify for nonrecognition treatment.
123. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
125. The Supreme Court stated the rule of substance over form in Weiss v. Steam, 265
U.S. 242 (1924): "Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually
done, rather than the declared purpose of the participants; and when applying the provisions
of the Sixteenth Amendment and income laws enacted thereunder we must regard matters
of substance and not mere form." Id. at 254; see Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324
U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
126. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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